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DISPUIE SETTLEMENT UNDER NAFI'A:
DO THE PARTIES HAVE THE Wil-L TO MAKE IT WORK?

by
Mary Jo Nicholson•
I.

Introduction

The Canada- United States Free Trade Agreement (CFTA)1 has now been in
effect for over five years with the result that we have relevant experience to apply to
the more recent North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTAY which replicates
many of the provisions of the CFTA This is particularly true in the area of dispute
settlement, There are three categories of dispute settlement under NAFTA The
general dispute settlement provisions are found in Chapter 20 and are available only to
the contracting parties or governments.3 These provisions extend to "all disputes
between the Parties regarding the interpretation or application" of the agreement or
situations where "a Party considers that an actual or proposed measure of another
Party is or would be inconsistent with the obligations of the agreement or cause
nullification or impairment" .. of the agreement4 The antidumping (AD) and
countervailing duty (CVD) dispute provisions are found in Chapter 19, and the
provisions relating to investor disputes are found in Chapter 11.

This article will outline the AD and CVD dispute provisions of the NAFTA
which are similar to those of the CFTA The experience under the CFTA provisions
will be reviewed paying particular attention to the cases affecting the pork and
softwood lumber industries. The article will conclude with a view forward towards
the operation ofthe provisions of Chapter 19 ofNAFTA.

• Professor, Ryerson Polytechnic University, Toronto, Canada.
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This is an important topic relating d.iredly to prospects for the ultimate success
of the new agreement While the CFfA and NAFfA are largely about the reduction
of tariffs, many domestic industries are affected by their provisions and will look for
any means available to protect themselves from the effects of global competition. The
long-tenn viability ofNAFfA may well depend upon the willingness of the domestic
governments of each PartY to adhere to the spirit of the dispute settlement provisions.
Manifestations of respect and acceptance by the governments of the Parties of the
decisions made under the AD and CVD provisions cany a great deal of weight in the
fonnative stages of the new relationship of the Parties. One writer has described the
situation, stating." The binational panel process of Chapter 19 will in many respects be
the crucible of the NAFTA As the vehicle for resolving AD and CVD cases brought
in any of the three contracting countries, Chapter 19 panels will be required to deal
with the types of trade conflicts that have historically generated intense, sometimes
passionate controversy...6
ll.

Chapter 19 ofNAFfA: the AD and CVD Dispute Settlement Provisions

AD and CVD dispute procedures were included in the CFTA at the insistence
of Canada where there was at the time of the negotiation of that agreement, a
perception that American contingent protection laws were applied subjectively. What
Canada really wanted from the AD and CVD negotiations was agreement by the
Parties on a set of common rules on subsidies and dwnping. however the two countries
were unable to agree on a bilateral regime providing for uniform provisions. It was
agreed instead,that each Party would reserve the right to apptr its own AD and CVD
law to goods imported from the territory of any other Party. With the proviso that
binding binational panel proceedings would be substituted for appeals to the courts of
either country. This was an important compromise on the part of the two Parties to the
CFTA and these provisions have been incoipOrated substantially unchanged into the
NAFI'A.
A

Binational Panel Review Replaces Judicial Review

Each country has promised to replace judicial review of final AD and CVD
duty dete:nninations with binational panel review.8 Under the GAIT, and under U.S.
and Canadian law AD and CVD duties cannot be imposed unless there is a finding of
dumping or subsidy and a finding of material injwy or threat of material injury to a
domestic industry. The CFIA provides that review based upon the administrative
record, a final AD or CVD determination of a competent investigating authority may
be requested in order to determine whether such detennination was in accordance with
the AD or CVD law of the importing Party.9 "Competent investigating authority is
defined in Canada as the Canadian International Trade Tnounal (CnT) or the Deputy

Minister of National Revenue for Customs and Excise.(.MNR); in the United States as
the International Trade Administration of the U.S. Department of Commerce
(Commerce) or the U.S. International Trade Comtnission (ITC); and in Mexico as the
designated authority within the Secretariat of Trade and Industrial Development
(SCFI).10 The panel appointed to review may then uphold a final determination, or
remand it for action not inconsistent with the panel's decision. 11 Panels must apply the
same domestic substantive law that the administering agency in. the importing countiy
m:ust apply. This law is defined as "relevant statutes, legislative histoJY, regulations,
administrative practice and judicial precedents" .12 The standard of review has been
defined by reference to specific legislation in each of the three countries with the
intention that it be the same as would be applied by the reviewing court of the
count:ry.13
It is interesting to note the comment by one observer, "At the time (that panels
were introduced in the CFIA) some regarded them as insubstantial innovations: the
Chapter 19 provisions creating panels neither adopted new substantive law nor
established a right of review that would not otherwise exist. Rather, those provisions
provided that Chapter 19 panels would serve simply as surrogates for reviewing courts
and decide cases in accordance with the same legal standards that courts would
apply."I4
B.

Composition of the Panels

The panels will be made up of five members, who "shall be of good character,
high standing and repute, and shall be chosen strictly on the basis of objectivity,
reliability, sound judgment and general familiarity with international trade law. The
Parties will maintain separate rosters of potential panelists, composed of sitting or
retired judges "to the fullest extent practicable. 15 It is interesting to note that the CFfA
did not include this specific preference for sitting or retired judges. 16 Panel members
must be citizens of one of the Parties but there is no requirement of proportional
representation on the basis of nationality. A majority of the panelists on each panel
shall be lawyers in good standing. Within 30 days of a request for a panel. each
involved Party shall appoint two panelists from the roster. Within 55 days of the
request for the panel. the involved Parties shall agree on the selection of a fifth
panelist 17
C.

Individuals May Access Proceedings

Unlike Chapter 20 proceedings. Chapter 19 panels are accessible by private
parties.18 This is consistent with Chapter 19 review as an extension of domestic
proceedings and with the fact that the involvement of government is generally less
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with Chapter 19 review than is the case with Chapter 20 review. It has been observed
that "though the language attempts to preserve the state-to-state nature of Agreement
by requiring that the fonnal request for a panel come from a government Party, the
clear implication is that governments must comply with the requests of individuals." 19
In Chapter 19 reviews, decisions are binding upon the Parties and there is no provision
for political negotiations. as is lhe case with Chapter 20 review. The fact that
individuals have standing in this review process also contributes to some of the
intensive lobbying in this area that will be referred to later in this paper.

D.

Allowable Time Limits for Panel Decisions

One of the objectives of the Parties is to see disputes resolved in a timely
fushion. For this reason, strict time limits have been imposed, the effect of which is to
result in final decisions within 315 days of the date on which a request for a panel is
20
made.
Generally panels have met these time limits, although there have been
exceptions due to panelists having stepped down to avoid any appearance of conflict
and also due to the remand procesg21 which can result in substantial delays before a
final determination is made.

E.

F.

The Extraordin ary Challenge Committee An Exception to the Rule of
Finality ofChaoter 19 Panel Decisions?

The only exception to the rule of finality of Olapter 19 panel decisions is a

limited one and it is found in the provision for the extraordinary challenge procedme
which provides for the establishment of an extraordinary challenge committee (ECC)
comprising three members which are selected from a joint roster comprised of judges
or former judges.Z5 This provision reads as follows:
Where, within a reasonable time after the panel decision is issued, an involved
Party alleges that
(a)

(ii)

(iii)

Effect of Chapter 19 Panel Decisions

The decision of a panel is binding upon the Parties with respect to the particular
matter that is before the panel.22 The finality of the panel's decision is further
emphasized by the provision which states that a final determination by a panel may not
be reviewed under the judicial review procedures of the importing Party provided that
the panel determination was requested within the time limits set out in NAFfA Thus
there can be no appeal from a panel decision to domestic courts.23 A casual observe:.
ofthis process, especially in recent cases could be forgiven for questioning the finality
of panel decisions. Most of this uncertainty is due to the provisions that the "panel
may uphold a final deten:n.ination or remand it for action not inconsistent with the
panel's decision Some of the recent cases involving multiple remands resemble
nothing so much as a ping-pong game between the panel and the detennining agency.
The question of the effect of successive remands to the determining agency was
by a panel in the first pork case when it concluded that it was required by
Article 1904 (8) of the CFTA to issue a "final decision", i.e. that the Agreement did
not contemplate or pennit successive remands. 24
. So far the history of the CFTA reveals several cases that demonstrate agency
reluctance to comply with panel decisions. In these cases, the panels have included
increasingly specific instructions to the agencies on remand and the tone of the
decisions of the agencies and the panels has become somewhat antagonistic.

(i)

(b)

a member of the panel was guilty of gross misconduct, bias, or a
'serious conflict of interest. or otherwise materially violated the
rules of conduct,
the panel seriously departed from a fundamental rule of
procedure, or
the panel manifestly exceeded its powers, authority or
jurisdiction set out in thi.s Article, for example by failing to apply
the appropriate standard of review, and

any of the actions set out in snbparagraph (a) has materially affected the
panel's decision and threatens the integrity of the binatiOn.al panel
review process,that party may avail itself of the extraordinary challenge
procedure set out in Annex 1904.13 26•

If an ECC finds that the narrow grounds for an extraordinary challenge have
been established, the ECC may vacate or remand the binational panel decision. v The
drafters of the extraordinmy challenge process expected that it would be used
infrequently.28 There are, at present, significant tensions between the Parties with
respect to the proper role of an ECC. "Thus far, these challengers have arisen solely
with respect to panel reviews of U.S. cases. At least in that context the initial tension
has been between a U.S. desire for broader appellate recourse in cases it believes were
wrongly decided by a panel and a Canadian desire to restrict extraordinary challenges
to rare instances of systemic abuse, such as gross misconduct or ultra vires action. 29
This issue has been addressed in each of the ECC decisions to dare. In the first ECC,
In the Matter of Fresh Chilled, or Frozen Pork from Canada30, the Committee stated:
"As its name suggests, the extraordinaty challenge procedure is not intended to
function as a routine appeal. Rather the decision of a binational panel may be
challenged and reviewed only in "extra9rdinaty" circumstances. While the legislative
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hist01y of the extraordinary challenge committee mechanism is lacking in specifics, it
is clear that the extraordinary challenge procedure is intended solely as a safeguard
against an impropriety or gross panel error that could threaten the integrity of the
binational panel review process...Notably, the legislative history states that an
extraordinary challenge committee is intended as a review mechanism for "aberrant
panel decisions" and that "the availability of or resort to extraordinmy challenge
committees should act to cure aberrant behavior by panelists".31 The Committee gave
further reasons, "As dJ.e procedural rules state, an extraordinary
committee is
composed of three judges or foaner judges of a federal court of the Umted States or of
a court of superior jurisdiction of Canada. The cballenge committee's fimction is to
determine whether a panel or panel member violated the three-prong standard of the
extraordinary challenge procedure. In contrast. a binational panel is composed
individuals with expertise in international trade law. The panel members' fimction 1s
to review the record evidence and the trade law issues that have been raised before the
panel have separate: :oles
competent investigating authority. The committee and
and different expertise; it is not the function of a commtttee to conduct a tradit:J.onal
appellate review regarding the merits of a panel decision. Another important
procedural distinction and indicator of
in review
the
panel review mechanism and the extraordinary challenge mechanism ts the disparate
amount of time allotted to the two tribunals for review. Under the procedural rules, an
extraordinary challenge committee typically is given only 30 days to issue a written
decision, whereas a binational panel generally is given 315 days to issue a decision. "32
The issue was also addressed by the second ECC in the Live Swine case: "The ECC
should be perceived as a safety valve in those extraordinary circumstances where a
challenge is warranted to maintain the integrity of the binational panel process....The
ECC should address systemic problems and not mere legal issues that do not threaten
1he integrity of the ITA's dispute resolution mecbanism itself A systemic problem
arises whenever the binational panel process itself is tainted by failure on the part of a
panel or a panellist to follow their mandate under the ITA. "33

t?e

m.

The Pork Cases

The "pork cases" actually include a nmnber of panel
the
specific details of which will not be outlined in this article. These cases can be divtded
for our pmposes into two categories,the Fresh Chilled and Frozen Pork from Canada
(Fresh Pork Case), and the Live Swine frOID Canada {Live Swine Case). Each of
cases involved panel reviews ofCVD determinations by Commerce as well as findings
of material injury by the lTC. Each of the cases involved multiple remands, and each
ofthe cases resulted in an appeal to the ECC.
These cases have exposed possible weaknesses in the AD and CVD dispute
settlement provisions, and have exerted considerable pressure on the system, severely

testing the commitment of the Parties to it They have received a great deal of
publicity especially in Canada, where the analogy of the "mouse in bed with the
elephant' still strikes a resonant chord. To be fair, we may attach too much
significance to the events in the pork cases. It.has been stated of these cases. ''the
issues were complicated, even for experts: the texts were lengthy; the
were confusing; and the mix of economics,
and law are difficult to sort out"

A

The Fresh Pork lnjwv Case

"This case was the :first in which a panel established under the CFfA had to
construe a U.S. statute that had not been construed previously."3s
The facts ofthe Fresh Pork (Injury) Case may be swnmarized as follows:
1.
2.

3.

4.

5.

The ITC determined that the U.S. induslly was threatened with material
injury by reason of subsidized pork imports :from Canada.
This decision was appealed by Canadian producers and provincial
governments.
The Chapter 19 panel tmanimously found that several of the fTC's
findings "rely heavily or flow directly from faulty use of statistics".36
The Panel remanded the determination to the agency, which re-opened
its record, and "attempted to strengthen the basis for its findings and
then re-issued the same decision".37
The Canadian parties requested another panel review. This panel
decision stated "the ITC's record has been combed not once but twice in
the search for substantial evidence of material injmy". The panel found
that a tbreat of material injury was not supported by substantial
evidence. The case was once again remanded to the ITC.
The ITC then reversed its decision, stating that it was required to do so
by the panel decision.

In the final stages of this case it became apparent that "the traditional cowtesies
of international dispute settlement, which had on the whole been observed in the
earlier phases of the pork case and in all of the other cases tmder Chapter 19 were
beginning to wear thin." 33 The situation continued to deteriorate. Professor
Lowenfeld describes the acrimonious tone of the Commissioners of the lTC in the
remand from the second panel decision as follows: "...And so on for more than thirty
pages. full of statemems referring to the panel's "preordained outcome," "cowterintuitive, counterfactual, and illogicaJ, but legally binding conclusion," "deliberate
misunderstanding of the Commission's view," "woeful lack of knowledge", "egregious
intrusion into the factual decision-making authority of the Commission"
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"impermissible reweighing of the evidence etc." It must be observed, however, that
these views were limited to two commissioners and for this reason may not represent
an on-going problem provided that this attitude is not take up by their fellow
Commissioners. Informed obseJVerS, however, view these developments with
concern. "Although the ITC reversal in the Pork (injury) case indicates that the U.S.
government honoured its commitment under FTA article 1904.9 to be bound by the
decisions of Chapter 19 panels, its statements and actions suggest that it was doing so
reluctantly. In the majority opinion on the second remand, Commissioners Ruhr and
Newquist repeatedly criticized the "panel's decision and warned that the decision
would not impact their future practice. The U.S. Government, at the w-gi.ng of the
ITC, requested an extraordinary challenge committee to review the panel's second
remand to the ITC. ,.40
B.

The ECC Decision in the Fresh Pork (Jnjuty) Case

The ECC, comprising two retired Canadian judges and one retired United
States judge, made a unanimous decision that the three-pronged requirement for
review "provides explicit, narrow grounds for extraordi:naiy challenges and makes
clear that an extraordinary challenge is not intended to function as a routine appeal.,t4!
The ECC stated that "the allegations do not meet the threshold for an extraordinary
challenge."
It is generally acknowledged that political pressure was a factor in the decision
to bring an extraocdinaiy challenge in this case. Consider the comments of Horlick &
deBusk writing in 1992: "Political pressure played a major role in the Pork Case
because the deadline for the U.S. Trade Representative's decision to invoke the ECC
process fell at the same time Congress was deciding whether to extend fast-track
legislation for an additional two years."42 At the relevant time, the US Trade
Representative received a number of multiple signature letters from "approximately 90
members of Congress encouraging her to request an ECC. The implicit message of the
letters was that support for fast-track extension was dependent on a request for an
ECC".43
A Canadian perspective is provided by Professor William Graham. who
wrote, "an examination of the recent Pork cases sends out conflicting signals, some
wonisome, some encou:raging, about the way the system is working. Dissatisfaction
in the U.S. led to the use of an ECC procedure..." There are several concerns about
the use of the procedure in this case. As there was no suggestion of corruption or bias
or a failure to observe natural justice before the tribunal, there is a real fear in
Canadian quarters that the use of the procedure in these circumstances, relying on the
excess of jmisdiction test, is an attempt by Americans to have an appeal procedure

introduced into the system. Lawyers familiar with arbitration will know all too well
are made to challenge arbitmtion awards before the courts when the real
motive 1s that one does not like the result If there is regular recourse to
b
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non-tariff _bamers which the agreement sought to eliminate.... It also
politietZeS an area which was suppose to be depoliticized." 44
C.

The Live Swine (Subsidy) Case

Canadians, lulled into thinking that the extraordinary challenge issue may have
by
Fresh Pork Case had a sudden awakening brought on by the Live
Swme affair. In this case _Canadian
provinci.al governments and producers brought
a
19 appeal agamst a finding by Commerce of subsidies on Canadian live
swme exported to
U.S. The first panel decision was released May 19, 1992 and
agency m.part and remanded the case in part. The agency confirmed its
pnor dectston and a second panel review was held. In its second decision, released
1992 the panel again affinned Commerce's detemrination in part and
October
remanded m
In response «:>
second detenn.ination on remand in which
Commerce
to find subsidies, the panel issued an order on December 27
1992 affirming Its
on remand. In the final remand,
cnttciZed the panel reviewing its final decision in the fourth
administrative I'eV!ew of Live Swine from Canada and announced that Commerce
would not adhere to it in any other cases.45

th;

On January 21, 1993, in the very early weeks of the Clinton administration, the
46
USTR filederfui
a request
an ECC.
Again political ,.-,c,,.,.... this tune
"
tbe need to
· . for
wh
.
.
...,
,
pow
o nught
the
of implementing legislation for
NAFfA was, certainly from the Canadian perspective, a factor in the decision to bring
the challenge.

D.

The Decision of the ECC in the Live Swine (Subsidy) Case

again, the ECC upheld the decision of the panel. The ECC stated in its
The
provi_des a three-prong test...A panel decision must reflect gross
DUsconduct or bxas, a senous departure from fundamental rules and manifest excess f
a panel's authority and jurisdiction to be over twned. The
cannot become
appeal. fonun for every frustrated. participant in the binational panel process" the
Conunittee stated.
ECC descnbed the task before it;" to detennine whether the
panel_
the scope of review and... whether it has been
consclentlously applied. The ECC found that the binational panel had correctly cited

OCC
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the star.adard of review and that the USTR had not
apply the properly articulated standard of review".

it "that the panel failed to

The result of the second ECC decision was to encourage those who thought
that the strongly wOJded decision wouJd convince American pork producers and other
like-mirtded industry associations that a Chapter 19 panel decision properly anived at
is final and binding upon the parties. Sanguine comments were written. e.g. "Most
commentators agree that the outcome of the Pork case has strengthened the integrity of
the binational panel system. In precluding the use of the extraordinary challenge
procedUJre as a means of "routine appeal" the decision both reinforced the authority of
the panels and limited the potential for political interference in the panel process.
Given tbis strong precedent, there is no reason to suspect that the procedure will be
employed any differently under NAFTA..8

IV.

(under threat of countervailing duties) agreed to impose a 15% export levy on its own
industly.

"In 1991, the Government of Canada in conjunction with four provincial
governments,49 undertook aj.oint study of the provincial stumpage systems, applying a
methodology employed in certain instances by the U.S. Forest Service. The Joint
Study was said to have demonstrated that stumpage revenues in all four of these
provinces exceeded the provinces' costs of adnrinistering their stumpage systems. On
this basis, Canada concluded that the MOU had served its purpose and gave notice to
the United States on September 3, 1991 that it intended to exercise its right to
terminate the MOU effective October 4, 1991. On October 4, Canada ceased to
collect the export charges provided for in the MOU."so The result was the current
spate of softwood lumber cases, which like the Pork cases can be· divided into a
subsidy phase and an injury phase.

t he Softwood Lumber Cases
B.

Although the writer would like to echo this optimism expressed after the
second pork ECC, recent developments in the trade relations between the two
contracting parties to the CFTA raise serious questions. Will the dispute resolution
settlement provfsjons receive sufficient support to ensure their efficacy at times when
they are most needed? An affinnative answer is fimdameotal to the long-term viability
of the any trade agreement Perhaps the optimism voiced after the ECC decision in the
first pork case is premature. Are we now in a period in which patience alone is
J"equired or do we also require vigilance (on the part of those familiar with the
process)? Can we provide more effective education of the general public as to the socalled "arcane" intricacies of international dispute settlement? It is this writer's opinion
that all three are necessary: patience to allow for the industries most affected by
liberalization of trade rules to come to terms with change; vigilance to ensure that
permanent damage is not inflicted on the new institutions in the interests of short-term
political gains; and education of legislators, lobbyists and lay people through a wider
dissemination of approachable information as to the dispute settlement provisions of
the CFfAINAFTA and their place in developing global trade agreements.
A.

The History ofU.S.-Canru:Ja Softwood Lmnber Controversy

This has been a troublesome area for the two Parties to the CFTA for several
decades, largely due to the difference in the two comrtries' methods of assessing timber
cutting costs which in the U.S. are established in advance by bidding on timber rights
and in Canada by payment of stumpage fees to the provincial governments which own
the timber rights. The situation was particularly volatile in the 80's. In 1986 the two
countries entered · into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in which Canada

The Softwood Lwnber (Injurv) Case

A final injury deten:nination in this case was made by the ITC on Alloaust 5,
1992. Canadian and provincial governments and Canadian producers requested a
review of the detennination. The panel's unanimous decision released on July 26,
1993, found fault with the ITCs conclusions and remanded the detennination to the
agency for further action. 51
The ITC filed its second determination on October 25, 1993 and. the
having reviewed it, again remanded the matter to the rrc on January 28,1994.5 On
March, 14, 1994, the ITC released its decision in which the .five commissioners
divided 3:2, the majority affirming that the U.S. softwood industiy is materially
injured by imports from Canada: Chairman Newquist and Commissioner Ruhr
"levelled a critique of the binational panel's remand determination. They fowtd the
record was sufficient to conclude that the domestic industry is currently experiencing
material injury, even ifforced to concede that the evidence on the record did not
indicate a cause and effect relationship between the Canadian imports and the price of
softwood lumber in the United States. On the basis of their conclusion that no cause
other than the Canadian imports fully explains the injury to the industty, they affinned
the commission's previous material injury finding. "53 This sort of reasoning in the
absence of adequate supportive evidence does not bode well for the future of the Ch.
19 dispute settlement system, although once again, it is Commissioners Ruhr and
Newquist who express these views so vehemently. The two dissenting members of the
lTC, Commissioners Watson and Nuzum did not find sufficient evidence to support a
material injury :finding.54 The panel will now have up to 90 days to review the ITC's
determination. The scenario is depressingly similar to that of the pork cases. This
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similarity is carried still fm1her when we observe the situation with respect to the
Softwood Lumber, Subsidy Phase.

Commerce issued its detennination after this remand on January 6, 1994,

"grudgingl,?; accepting a Canada-U.S. Trade Panel decision that puni1ive tariffs... be
C.

The Softwood Lumber (Subsidy) Case

On May 28, 1992, Commerce published its Final Detenninarion that the
stumpage systems of the four provinces in question had conferred a subsidy on
softwood lumber exports... and assessed a "country-wide" weighted average rate of
6.51% on softwood lumber exports from all provinces and territories under
investigation. ss A panel was convened pursuant to the CFrA on July 29, 1992 .and on
May 6, 1993 the panel unanimously issued remand instructions to the agency
(Commerce).56 Commerce issued its Detemlina1ion on Remand on September 17,
1993, in which it affinned its previous determinations concerning both stumpage and
log export restraints, and increased the applicable country wide rate from 6.51% to
11.54% ad valorem. 57 The panel's decision of December 17, 1993 raises some
interesting issues. The majority of the panel, the three Canadians, concluded the
following:
1.

That Commerce has firiled to provide a rational basis for its conclusion
that provincial stumpage programs are specific.58

2.

That Commerce's finding that provincial stumpage programs distort the
normal competitive markets for softwood lumber is not supported by
substantial evidence.
That Commerce's determination that the log export restraints imposed
by British Columbia confer a benefit on a specific industry is
unsupported by evidence on the record.

3.

The minority, which dissented from all three conclusions, comprised the two
American members of the panel. Perhaps the most important observation about this
decision is that it represents the first time that the decision of a panel has split clearly
along national lines. This is particularly significant given the comment of the two
dissenting American panelists that , "We believe that the Majority's formulation of the
standard of review is incorrect in a number of critical points and that it leads the
Majority into a misconceived exercise that clearly exceeds its jurisdiction."S9 The
dissenting panelists, Pomeranz and Reisman, go further and state, "the Majority has
failed to keep that second prong, viz. United States law governing this matter, in focus
and as a result has conducted a defective review: the Majority has applied review
standards not to U.S. law, but to what the Majority believes U.S.law should be. In our
view, the governing legislation and rules in this case, the Tariff Act and the Proposed
Regulations, are clear in their terms and their proper applica1ion to this case, but they
60
have been materially misconstrued by the Majority of the Panel.

removed."

1

On April 7, 1994, the United States announced an extraordinary challenge
against the roling on the grounds that the three Canadian members of the panel had
exceeded the bounds of the panel's authority by deciding that neither of the subsidy
programs...at issue were countervailable, and also that two of the three Canadians
failed to disclose that they worked for legal finns whose clients included hunber
companies and the Canadian govermnent.62
Many Canadians have seen this
as yet another attempt to convert the
extraordinary challenge provisions into a normal appellate forum. Before joining in
this conclusion too hastily, there are several factors which must be considered. The
first is the actual wording of the provision for the extraordinary challenge. "Where, ...

an involved Party alleges
... that party may avail itself of the extraordinary
chollenge procedure set out in Annex 1904.13. Note that the wording is not "where it
can be demonstrated that", or "where there is evidence of' or other wording that would
suggest an objective test as to whether the extraordinaty challenge procedure is

available. Instead we have a clearly subjective test, which imposes no limitation upon
the circumstances in which a Party may make an allegation under these provisions.
Thus Canadian observers should not be so smprised when extraordinary challenges are
brought, even in circumstances which do not appear to meet the three-pronged test
which will be applied by the ECC.
Also worth noting is the fact that a private party cannot itself invoke the ECC
process. It must be a Party which makes the allegations. This provision should result
in some control over the frequency of extraordinary challenges as a party cannot
initiate a challenge but is required to convince its own government of the
appropriateness of a challenge. In the case of the Softwood Lumber (Subsidy) Case
these private interests have been anned with potent ammunition in the remarks of the
two American panelists.63
V.

Conclusion

An assessment of the success of the AD and CVD dispute settlement provisions
of Chapter 19 of the CFTA provides some cause for optimism together with some
m.isgivings.Does our experience so far augur well for the similar provisions of
NAFTA? On the positive side there is considerable agreement that the panels have
performed well, viz," ...CFTA Chapter 19 panels, on the whole, have demonstrated a
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high degree of conscientiousness and professionalism. Counsel appearing before
Chapter 19 panels routinely face panelists who
exceptionally well
decisions frequently include detailed analyses of the relevant law of the Unport:mg
Party and careful discussions of the facts. Opinions typically reflect a diligent effort
on the part of the panelists to apply the law fairly and correctly. Indeed, some of the
most thoughtful discussions of difficult issues to appear anywhere-for example,
64
specificity-are fowtd in opinions of CFfA binational panels." These comments are
echoed by Professor Huntington. "Experience wtder the Canada-U.S. FTA suggests
that panels will function effectively in resolving particular disputes. The Canada-U.S.
panels have generally issued
.decisions in a timely_
as Professor
Lowenfeld points out, these deciSions have been of high quality....
Pror;ssor
Huntington reiterates the comments of Professor Lowenfeld, wlw wrote m !991, The
and
panelists have been thoughtful; their opinions have been thorough
their conclusions on the whole persuasive....One could not detect a biaS m favor of
protectionism or unrestricted trade. While the panels have differed from one another,
no "Canadian approach" or "American approach" has emerged. ,,66

are

To these hopeful comments must be added, some cautionary !emarks. One
concern relates to the conclusion that there does not appear to be any bias based upon
the nationality of the panelists. Professor Lowenfeld's remarks were
at the
time 1hey were made. It is only recently, in the Softwood Lumber (Substdy) Case, that
a "national" split bas been discernible. As recently as Februaxy of 1993, commentators
Horlick & deBusk could state, "Moreover, there has been no correlation between the
nationality of the FrA panelists and the result. In the Fresh Chilled.or
from Canada decision on injury, U.S. panelists sided with Canadian panelists m
reaching a unanimous decision against the rrc. ,.6?
Professor Huntington echoes this opinion. stating "(e)xperience under chapter
19 of the Canada-U.S. FrA suggests that the citizenship of panelists will not pose a
cases between
problem of partiality."68 He cites a study of chapter
and July 1991 which found no discemahle correlation between the nabonality of
panelists and the result 69 It is too early to say whe1her the
Lumtx:r"
(Subsidy) Case is an exception to the many cases which have preceded tt 0:
1t
signifies 1he beginning of a new acrimony to be reflected in Chapter 19 dectSions.
The other factor which must concern the observer of the Chapter 19 process is
the possibility of too frequent resort to an extraordinary challenge to prevent or
postpone acceptance of unpalatable decisions. It may be prudent in this context to
heed the remarks ofProfessor Lowenfeld, "I was worried that Chapter 19 of the FTA
might go the way of the World Bank Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States- which
been seriously
undermined by repeated resort to a procedme for annulment of arbitral awards that

was intended as a safety valve for gross violations of due process but bas come to be
used by dissatisfied litigants as a device for delay and repeated appeals. "70 "On the
other hand, the issue may well dissipate as Chapter 19 proceedings become more
routine and the jurisprudence of extraordiruuy challenge committees is established.
Agency resistance to Chapter 19 panel review may prove to have been an U1lSUiprising
growing pain occasioned by a significant innovation in bilateral dispute resolution. If
such growing pains persist, however, they will present an issue that goes to the heart of
the Chapter 19 binational panel process."71 The same author states further, "One of
the dramas of the NAFI'A will be played out on this stage of extraordinaiy challenge
provisions. Unlike Chapter 19 panels themselves, which must operate within the
general confines of the existing, applicable domestic law, cballenge committees
construing and applying article 1904(13) are fashioning a new jurisprudence. That
strain of case law will undoubtedly affect how the Chapter 19 panel process will
function. If extraordinary challenge committee decisions continue to.limit recourse to
extraordiruuy challenges to truly extraordinary abuses of the Chapter 19 panel PfOCCSS,
then the arbitral model of nomeviewable dispute resolution will remain intact." 72 The
writer agrees with these remarlcs. This is why the upcoming decision of the ECC in
the Softwood Lumber (Subsidy) Case is so important and why a possible challenge in
the other phase of the Softwood Lumber case is of such concern to Canadians,
It is not SUiprising that Canadians appear to be more concerned about any
indications that the dispute settlement provisions of Cl!.apter 19 might breakdown. As
the much smaller Party to the CFIA, Canada viewed the Chapter 19 dispute settlement
provisions as :fimdamental to its participation in the agreement. It bas been said of
NAFTA that there is a need for candour in assessing the pros and cons of the
73
agreement. Such candour should also be applied to dispute settlement under Chapter
19. The Parties have established a regime where the final say on AD and CVD duties
now lies with a supra-national body. Are the citizens of the Parties able to accept this
or bave national policy makers moved too far down the path of intemational agreement
with its concomitant limitation of sovereignty? This can result in the Parties creating a
situation where they cannot honour their international conunitments without losing too
much political support domestically. The tensions which are created and the
inconsistency of statements and actions are all too understandable in this context

This situation will only be exacerbated under NAFrA "...(P)anel members will
be navigating the jurisprudence of another country and possible relying on their host
country colleagues on the panel...In the case of the NAFTA panels involving Mexico,
panelists will be required to bridge even wider cultural and legal gaps. Unlike both
Canada and the United States, Mexico is a civil law cotmtry, not a conunon law
country. In addition, Mexico does not have the trade law history and experience of
either the United States or Canada. Language differences will present new challenges

70
71

generally not encountered in CFrA proceeding. In these respects NAFTA panels will
face new complications."74
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It is interesting to note that the Joint Working Group on Dispute Settlement
established by the American Bar Association, the Canadian Bar Association and the
Barra Mexicana do not appear to bave any serious concerns wi1h respect to Chapter
19 Procedures. "A major recommendation of the Joint Working Group was the
maintenance of the FTA Chapter 19 procedures in relation to antidumping and
countervail measures. These have, in fact, been retained and expanded to deal with
the three party fonnat. This system is well known and need not be reviewed here.
The Working Group was strongly of the opinion that this mechanism be retained and
is most content that this has been done."75
. In appraising the success or failure of these provisions, we should not lose sight
of the fact that Chapter 19 was drafted as an interim measure for the period in which
76

the Parties were negotiating common rules for governing dumping subsidies. We are
also dealing with the legal systems of tbree different countries. It is important that we
do not judge these provisions too harshly. What is most important at this stage, is that
interested observers in all three Parties are convinced on balance, that the system is
operating fairly and that "justice is seen to be done". If this is the case the system
should survive and support the ongoing trading relationship of the Parties.
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When teaching "corporations," have you ever felt that there was a larger than
usual disparity between the subject as taught and the probable future experiences of
our students? The classic features of a corporation-limited liability, perpetual
duration, ease of transferability of interest, and centralized management, seem so
remote from the intimate, close corporations many of our students are likely to deal
with.
After graduation, A Abbie, in the front row, B. Benny, who sits behind her and
C. Cindy in the back, may fonn "ABC Cookie Corp.", to exploit C. Cindy's recipe for
chocolate chip cookies. They will invest their life's savings, devote all of their time and
efforts to the success of the ventW'e, and dream of lifetimes of happy employment
including handsome compensation packages, bonuses and benefits. They may even
look forward to the day they will sell their interests, retire to Hawaii and be
remembered as the latest incarnations of"Famous Amos."
They will each be shareholders, board members, and officers. They will
probably not conduct regular board meetings, have annual shareholder's meetings,
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